East of Owainat crossing of the Brotherhood and terrorism to Sudan

By :Dr. Osama Ahmed El-Mustafa

At the heart of this picture is the Egyptian base of East Al-Owainat, which is referred to by multiple reports and sources as a platform for supporting air operations inside Sudan, and cross-information goes that the region has witnessed the operation of Turkish-made drones, including Bayraktar aircraft, in the context of operations related to the Sudanese war.

Reports have proven that  terrorist brigades affiliated with the Government of PortSudan use them with the presence of Iranian experts and technicians, and intertwined regional roles. Under professional investigative standards, the accumulation of these data and clues should not be treated as mere narratives, but as a file that needs to be cross-verified and independently documented before moving from the level of strong evidence to the level of conclusive truth.

In an investigation published by  Reuters on February 2, 2026, Alexander Dziadosh, Marin Delero and Maria Paula Laguna pointed out, based on statements from officials, experts and satellite imagery, that the appearance of Turkish Bayraktar Akinci drones at East Owainat airport, near the Sudanese border, is an indication of a possible escalation in the Sudanese war and deeper Egyptian involvement in the conflict. Images taken in September, December 2025 and January 2026 showed the presence of the aircraft, along with expansion and rehabilitation works for runway and airport facilities.

According to Reuters, two Egyptian security officials said that in about eight months, two airports in southern Egypt had been provided with military equipment to secure the border and carry out strikes under the pretext of protecting (national security). Military experts also pointed out that the presence of support equipment, ammunition and the movement of aircraft between hangars increases the possibility of their operational use, while forces of a founding  government  said they had been attacked by Akinci aircraft, without Reuters being able to independently verify these claims.

These facts place Sharq al-Owainat at the center of questions about the nature of Egypt’s role in the Sudanese war, as the issue is no longer limited to political  and logistical support, as the evidence reported by Reuters suggests, but rather opens the door to the possibility of Cairo moving to a more direct level of managing threats coming from Sudanese territory, a shift that would redraw the war’s regional balances and trajectories.

The Sudanese war is no longer a purely internal affair, and the country’s skies are no longer a closed theater on both sides of the conflict  , as the longer the war spreads, the more its shadows extend beyond the borders, and the desert, which in military calculations seemed to be a geographical vacuum, began to turn into a silent logistical depth and possible corridors for supporting operations and reshaping the balance of power.

But the importance of eastern Owainat lies not only in its geographical location, but in  the military meaning that the location can acquire if it is proven to be linked to operations inside Sudan. Distance from the frontlines can give any rear base a strategic advantage, relative  safety, operational depth, and the ability to reposition away from direct fire.

The sensitivity of the file is heightened when these narratives intersect with reports of raids on areas in Darfur and Kordofan, and with talk of strikes  that came yesterday and extended to targets inside Chadian territory near the Sudanese border. While it has been proven that there is an operational link between these strikes and installations and entities outside Sudan, the scene goes beyond the concept of military support to  an actual internationalization of the theater of operations, which puts the sovereignty of states, border security and regional peace to a very serious test.

Cairo has engaged  in a broad security and political confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood inside Egypt over the past years, while political and media voices accuse it of allowing, directly or indirectly, the support of a Sudanese military institution that includes elements and battalions linked to the  Islamic terrorist  movement.

This contradiction raises a question that cannot be ignored: Does Cairo view Sudanese Islamists as a different file from the Islamists inside Egypt, or have regional security calculations and the Sudanese war produced arrangements, which transcend ideological boundaries?

The thread does not end in Cairo, as the circulating narratives also talk about Turkish and Iranian technical and armament roles in Egypt’s orbit,  which is a paradox, and about Gulf financial support from a major strategic country and military training in the field of drones from Iran.The war itself produces an enormous surplus of competing narratives, and disinformation may become as much a part of the battle as planes and drones.

But the most pressing question is not just who owns the weapons, but who owns the chain of decision, who provides the platform, who provides the technology, who sets the targets, who provides the support, and who bears responsibility when the strike crosses the political boundaries of the country in which the war is taking place?

The danger does not stop when the fighting is prolonged. The continuation of war, coupled with the collapse of state institutions and the expansion of displacement and asylum, creates a fertile environment for the proliferation of armed groups and transnational networks, and in such environments, Sudan could, against the will of millions of civilians, turn from a war zone into a potential incubator for the reproduction of extremism and the regional circulation of violence.

East of Owainat, and its connection to Sudanese operations, therefore appears to be more than just a military facility on the borders of the desert. It may be a link in a broader chain that redistributes the military geography of the war, shifting its center of gravity from the lines of contact to a network of bases, corridors, and cross-border platforms.

At the end of this thread, the harshest truth remains clear: the war that began inside Sudan is no longer confined to Sudan, and the more foreign platforms, cross-border technologies, and regional financing enter it, the more expensive it becomes, and the chances of extinguishing it diminish.

The question is no longer who is bombing, but who is opening the way for bombing, who is supplying the war with a new breathing tube, and who is paying the price for all this?